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In the general climate created by the Cold 
War, the Canadian government 
welcomed refugees from the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with 
open arms. It offered generous reception 
to thousands of Hungarians fleeing the 
1956 Soviet invasion, to Czechoslo- 
vakians escaping the repression 
following the 1968 "Prague Spring," to 
Poles fearing persecution for 
participation in the Solidarity move- 
ment, and to Soviet Jews propelled to 
leave by state anti-Semitism. 
Shattering political reforms in the 
Soviet bl& countries brought about the 
demise of the Community Party's 
totalitarian rule. One of the positive 
outcomes was the end of the Cold War. 
But the Gorbachev reforms opened a 
new can of worms. Nationalist 
movements erupted throughout the 
region, leading to the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia. Only the latter has so far 
been spared the violence between rival 
ethnic groups striving to create or 
strengthen their nation. Several newly 
independent states have engaged in 
bloody territorial disputes and violent 
repression of ethnic minorities. The rise 
of Russian nationalism has made life 
precarious for Russian Jews. Millions of 
people have been uprooted by these 
conflicts, yet the reaction of the Canadian 
government to the political processes in 
the region was to cancel its special 
refugee policy. 
Prior to September 1990, most 
refugees from the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe came as members of the 
Designated Class. The 1976 Immigration 
Act allows for two categ~ries of refugees 
to be admitted to Canada. Convention 
refugees are those who fall under the 
definition set out by the 1951 UN 
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Convention and 1967 Protocol on 
refugees. They have to demonstrate a 
well-founded fear of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion or membership 
in a political, social or ethnic minority 
group. In addition, they must be outside 
their country of origin and unable to get 
protection from their native government. 
The Canadian government recognizes 
that there are categories of people who 
do not fit this rigid definition, yet who 
may also find themselves in refugee-like 
situations. The 1976 Immigration Act 
therefore gives authority to the 
Governor-in-Council to designate such 
categories of people and admit them 
under the refugee class. In 1976 self- 
exiled Soviet and East European citizens 
were defined as falling under this 
category. Although most of these 
emigr6s could not demonstrate a well- 
founded fear of individual persecution 
in their countries of origin, given the tight 
Several newly independent 
states have engaged in 
bloody territorial disputes 
and violent repression of 
ethnic minorities. 
exit-control situation there, their 
departure would have been treated as an 
act of treason subject to severe reprisals. 
Sweeping political reforms 
throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, and especially the removal or 
relaxation of the strict exit control, have 
prompted a significant policy change. 
On August 17, 1990, Employment and 
Immigration ' Minister Barbara 
McDougall announced that the 
Designated Class for self-exiled persons 
would be phased out. Instead she 
reinstituted normal immigration 
processing for citizens of this region. This 
policy is still active, in spite of the 
exploding refugee population in former 
Soviet bloc states. The rest of the article 
will deal with Canadian refugee policy 
towards the Soviet Union. Since the 
1970~~ most of those who have come to 
Canadafrom this country are Jewish. The 
article will focus on them. 
Emigration Potential of Russian 
Jews 
The sharp decline in living standards for 
most people in the former Soviet Union, 
combined with intense dissatisfaction 
with the existing political leaders, have 
produced a political vacuum that is 
easily filled by ultraright nationalist 
groups. Just a year ago, such organiza- 
tions were insigtuficant in size, never 
exceeding a few hundred members. 
Within the last year, their numbers and 
membership experienced a dramatic 
growth. Now they enjoy the support of 
thousands of Russian people. According 
to some estimates, up to 30 percent of the 
population view them favourably. 
The rise of nationalism poses a threat 
to democratic leaders, supporters and 
ethnic minorities, including Jews. There 
are over fifty nationalist, profascist and 
anti-Semitic publications and one radio 
station in Russia. The state can no longer 
contain them peacefully. It should not be 
surprising, under those circumstances, 
that thousands of Jews feel threatened 
and are considering leaving their 
country. 
Severe shortages of employment 
and housing in Israel have discouraged 
many potentialemigrants from choosing 
this country as their destination. 
Although Germany has committed itself 
to accepting 30,000 Jews from the former 
Soviet Union, many of them find it 
difficult to overcome their distrust of 
Germans and fear that history may 
repeat itself in Germany. Other countries 
do not seem to rush to the rescue of 
Russian Jews. 
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Soviet Arrivals Then and Now 
Before the 1976 Immigration Ad became 
effective in 1978, Soviet Jews were 
admitted to Canada mainly as 
independent immigrants. Starting in 
1978 they started coming under the 
Designated Class category. Between 
1978 and 1981 these refugees from the 
U.S.S.R. constituted an important part of 
the Canadian refugee flow (see Table 1). 
When Soviet authorities tightened exit 
visa regulations between 1982 and 1987, 
their inflow into Canada dropped 
sigruficantly. The few who were allowed 
toleave the Soviet Union were sponsored 
by family members. In 1988 the flow 
increased again. In the last two years of 
the refugee program for the U.S.S.R., a 
large proportion of Soviet people came 
under the private sponsorship of the 
Jewish Immigrant Aid Service of Canada 
(JIAS) as members of the Designated 
Class. 
For a number of reasons, until 1990 
the Canadian policy towards refugees 
from the U.S.S.R. was very generous. 
First, the Canadian government's Cold 
War mentality influenced its perception 
of those fleeing the Soviet Union as 
victims of Communist rule and in need 
of protection by the West. Soviet 
emigrants were used as an ideological 
weapon against the U.S.S.R. At the same 
time, Soviet immigrants provided 
ideological support for right-wing and 
centre-right-wing political parties in 
Canada. Thus in Canada they were 
preferred over those refugees who were 
persecuted because of their left-wing 
affiliations. 
Second, Canadian resettlement of 
Soviet Jews was part of a multilateral 
arrangement with Austria,Italy, the U.S., 
Australia and New Zealand. Under this 
agreement, Austria and Italy provided 
temporary asylum to Soviet self-exiled 
Jews, while other countries offered them 
permanent resettlement. 
Third, relatively high levels of the 
refugees' educational achievement (see 
Table 2) made Soviet-Jewish settlement 
in Canada attractive when Canada was 
making a significant effort to increase the 
number of skilled workers in the labour 
force. 
Finally, Canadian-Jewish organiza- 
tions pressured the government to 
increase the intake of Soviet Jews who, 
they felt, were denied the right to practise 
their religion and traditions and were 
subject to discriminatory practices at 
school and at work In addition to its role 
as a lobby group, JIAS also provided 
significant settlement assistance to 
newly arrived immigrants. Further- 
more, as mentioned earlier, it was 
successful in bringing many Soviet Jews 
under its sponsorship. 
By 1990 the situation in the Soviet 
Union and Canada changed in a number 
of important ways. Dramatic political 
changes in the Soviet Union altered 
perception of its emigres. They could no 
longer be viewed as opponents of 
Communist rule since the latter was 
crumbling. Soviet Jews lost their 
ideological attractiveness to Western 
countries. They were now regarded as 
economic immigrants in search of better 
material opportunities elsewhere in the 
world. 
The Canadian government was 
aware of the rise of anti-Semitism in the 
-- - 
Table 1: Refugees from Major Refugee-Source Countries to Canada, 1978-87 (in percentages) 
Country 
Vietnam 
Poland 
Kampuchea 
Laos 
El Salvador 
Czechoslovakia 
U.S.S.R. 
Iran 
Ethiopia 
Romania 
Hungary 
Chile 
Guatemala 
Nicaragua 
Afghanistan 
Sri Lanka 
Total 
37.7 
13.3 
7.2 
7.2 
6.0 
3.9 
2.4 
2.3 
2.3 
2.2 
1.8 
1.3 
1.2 
1.2 
1.0 
0.5 
Totalnumber 848 27,517 40,348 14,981 16,927 13,970 15,345 16,754 19,147 21,530 187,367 
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Soviet Union, yet it sought a remedy in 
Jewish repatriation in Israel. This 
solution was strongly advocated by 
Israel and was supported by a number of 
pro-Zionist organizations in the U.S. and 
Canada. Furthermore, as the Vienna- 
Rome pipeline for Soviet immigrants 
ceased to exist in October 1989, Canada 
was relieved of its international 
responsibility in assisting its allies in 
settling Soviet Jews. At that time, most 
Soviet emigrants were streamlined to 
Israel. 
By cancelling its refugee policy for 
Soviet and Eastern European immi- 
grants, the Canadian government felt it 
was responding to criticisms of 
favouritism expressed by the Canadian 
Council for Refugees and other interest 
groups concerned for refugees. 
While JIAS continued to lobby on 
behalf of Soviet Jews, it did not challenge 
the government's decision to dis- 
continue the refugee program, but 
insisted that those Jews applying under 
family sponsorship or as independent 
immigrants should be given extra 
considerationby visa officers inMoscow. 
In April 1992 JIAS Montreal, along with 
Allied Jewish Community Services, 
entered into an agreement with the 
Quebec Ministry of Cultural Com- 
munities and Immigration to bring 
approximately one hundred Jewish 
families from the former Soviet Union 
over four months in the winter and 
spring of 1993. These families will have 
to qualify as independent immigrants 
according tothe Quebec point system. At 
the same time, all of the selected families 
will have to have relatives in Montreal 
who are expected to help them with their 
settlement needs and employment. If 
this pilot project is successful-that is if 
the selected immigrants remain in 
Montreal, speak French, find employ- 
ment and do not require public 
assistancmther Soviet-Jewish families 
will be accepted under the same 
agreement. 
Table 2 
Educational Attainment of Refugees in Canada from 
Major Refugee-Producing Countries, 1978-87 
(in percentages) 
- Highest level of educational attainment - 
Less than Secondary University Total 
Country secondary graduate graduate 
U.S.S.R. 46.8 31.8 21.4 100.0 
Romania 33.3 46.5 20.2 100.0 
Poland 41.3 38.8 19.9 100.0 
Iran 56.7 26.3 17.0 100.0 
'Afghanistan 67.5 18.1 14.4 100.0 
Czechoslovakia 47.7 40.2 12.1 100.0 
Nicaragua 76.3 15.0 8.7 100.0 
Hungary 41.6 50.5 7.9 100.0 
Ethiopia 69.2 23.6 7.2 100.0 
Sri Lanka 59.4 34.3 6.3 100.0 
Guatemala 80.1 16.3 3.6 100.0 
Chile 76.6 20.9 2.5 100.0 
El Salvador 81.7 16.0 2.3 100.0 
Vietnam 90.0 8.1 1.9 100.0 
Laos 93.3 5.9 0.8 100.0 
Kampuchea 94.9 4.5 0.6 100.0 
Inland Refugee Status 
Determination 
The process of refugee selection by 
overseas visa officers is one of two 
venues for refugee admission set out by 
the 1976 Immigration Act. The second 
way is through an inland status 
determination of refugee claims. Until 
recently, very few Soviet citizens chose 
that route because of extreme difficulties 
in getting a visitofs exit visa from the 
Soviet Union. In the ten years following 
the introduction of the Immigration Act, 
only tlurty people from the Soviet Union 
made refugee claims. Most of these 
claims were rejected. In 1989,1990 and 
1991 it became relatively easy for Soviet 
people to travel abroad. To get an exit 
visa, they needed an invitation from a 
friend or arelative. As long as at least one 
of the family members stayed behind, 
they were almost guaranteed an entry 
visa to Canada. Some of these visitors 
chose to stay in Canada. Not all of them 
applied for refugee status. Some were 
sponsored by JIAS, others by their 
relatives, while still others were admitted 
as independent immigrants. But the 
number of Soviet refugee claimants 
started rising as well. While in 1990 112 
Soviet citizens applied for refugee status, 
their number reached 1,385 by the end of 
1991. 
In 1991 the perception of the 
situation in the U.S.S.R. and decisions 
made on refugee claims were uneven. 
Factors that explain the Canadian 
refugee policy for selecting refugees 
from overseas donot apply to the process 
of refugee status determination. 
Canadian refugee policy is influenced by 
foreign policy objectives, ideological and 
security concerns, economic interest, 
public opinion and lobbying by various 
pressure groups. Refugee status 
determination, while not completely 
devoid of these influences, seems to 
reflect individual panel members' 
perception of the general situation in a 
refugee's country of origin. This 
perception is shaped by the media 
coverage of a refugee-producing 
country, by the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (IRB) documentation 
centre's documents that are at the 
- 
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disposal of legal counsel and panel 
members, and by country profile reports 
prepared by specialists. Before the 
attempted August coup, mass media 
emphasized positive changes in the 
Soviet Union. Not much information 
was available on the rise of nationalism 
at the time. It is no surprise that many IRB 
members felt that while Jews suffered 
from discrimination, they were not 
persecuted in the Soviet Union and were 
therefore ineligible for refugee status. 
Thus one IRB member writes in a 
summary report on a case heard in May 
1991: 
In our opinion, the evidence presented at 
this haaring does not kad us to conclude 
that thereisa reasonable possibility that the 
claimants would su& persecution should 
they return tothe U.S.S.R. Therehavebeen 
rumours of pogroms; no pogroms have 
taken place, however. There have been 
threats of civil war; civil war has yet to 
erupt, however, and should such a war by 
some azvful chance erupt, many nationals, 
including lews, would be affected. We are 
not persuaded, moreover, on the basis of the 
evidence before us, that Jews would be at 
any greater rkk than other citizens in a 
civil war situation in the U.S.S.R. 
Another IRB member writes about 
another case heard at the same time: 
... thefr~edomofexpressionhasgimriseto 
numerous controversial opinions, 
including anti-Semitism. However, this 
anti-Semitism is neither government 
sponsored nor approved by the Soviet 
authorities. Consideringall this, the panel 
is of the opinion that the harassment and 
discrimination that the claimants may 
have received in the U.S.S.R. does not 
amount to persecution. 
The coup brought much confusion and 
uncertainty, and thus cases scheduled to 
be heard shortly thereafter were 
adjoumeduntilthe situationin the Soviet 
Union became clearer. In the fall, the 
perception that Jews experienced 
disaimination rather than persecution 
persisted among some panel members. 
One Soviet-Jewish claimant states: 
[Panel members] beliew that just because 1 
had five fights in the last ten years and 
heard one hundred insults, it is not 
Table 3 
Results of Refugee Claims Adjudicated in 1991 
Sri Lanka 
Iraq 
Somalia 
Iran 
Sudan 
Lebanon 
Seychelles 
Ethiopia 
Afghanistan 
Zaire 
Cuba 
Yugoslavia 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Kenya 
Peru 
U.S.S.R. 
Pakistan 
Syria 
Romania 
Chile 
Venezuela 
Honduras 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Haiti 
Ghana 
Bangladesh 
Nicaragua 
India 
Bulgaria 
Nigeria 
China 
Poland 
Czechoslovakia 
Others 
Total 
- Listed by Country of Origin - 
Claims heard 
to completion 
Positive 
decision 
4,458 
234 
3,672 
1,875 
150 
1,794 
196 
395 
137 
207 
98 
82 
1,351 
352 
90 
144 
433 
446 
81 
392 
89 
38 
100 
48 
112 
103 
233 
146 
83 
81 
517 
72 
537 
33 
11 
635 
19,425 
Negative 
decision 
154 
11 
292 
188 
21 
283 
33 
71 
26 
40 
27 
23 
417 
116 
32 
56 
172 
193 
43 
212 
50 
26 
69 
44 
103 
122 
285 
216 
131 
142 
1,064 
160 
1,951 
148 
150 
445 
7,516 
Ratio 
pos. /neg. 
28.9 
21.3 
12.6 
10.0 
7.1 
6.3 
5.9 
5.6 
5.3 
5.2 
3.6 
3.6 
3.2 
3.0 
2.8 
2.6 
2.5 
2.3 
1.9 
1.8 
1.8 
1.5 
1.4 
1.1 
1.1 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
1.4 
2.6 
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persecution. These m e  just accidents. No 
one broke into my apartment, no one put a 
knifP to my thmt ,  no one made a thraat to 
mylifP. Well, yes, Igotphonecalls. YetIgot 
flyers in my mail. I'm also &en brought to 
a police station because I believe I should 
fight back But they da ' t  believe it is a 
serious crime, especially because there is 
anti-Semitism in Canada as well. But in 
Canada there is a law that makes it possible 
to sue someone who insults you. In the 
U.S.S.R. it does not exist. When I went to 
complain about aperson insulting me, they 
told me at the police station, "Wake up! 
Who is going to listen to you if you have 
'kike' written all over your face." So to 
whom should I appeal for help, if 
militiamen talk like this? 
As more and more reports about the 
rise of profascist, anti-Semitic organi- 
zations began appearing in Soviet and 
Western media, panel members started 
concluding that Soviet Jews could be in 
jeopardy if they returned home, and even 
though pogroms had not started in 
Russia yet, Jews had genuine reasons to 
fear for their lives. This, of course, did not 
guarantee a positive decision in every 
case, even though some panel members 
observed that most Soviet cases are like 
"twins." Yet many seemingly strong 
cases were still rejected. But at the same 
time, some cases in which persecution 
was not evident received positive 
decisions. Decisions often depend on 
which IRB member is hearing the case 
(some are more predisposed to reach 
negative decisions than others), on the 
lawyer representing the case (some 
lawyers seem to have consistently 
positive decisions made on cases they 
represent), on how well claimants can 
serve as witnesses, and on other 
idiosyncratic features of the hearing. In 
the words of one claimant evaluating the 
outcome, "It depends on good weather 
and a good night's sleep. If the judge has 
slept well, he would grant the status. All 
these are human factors. All the stories 
that you come up with (and some say 
you've got to come up with a good story), 
well, it is all the same to them." Another 
claimant recalled, "I had an impression 
that the judges did not believe me, that 
they had made their decision already and 
that nothing I said was going to change 
it." 
In adjudicating refugee claims, 
panel members often make use of 
country profiles prepared by area 
speaahts. Such a report on the U.S.S.R. 
was prepared in the summer of 1991 and 
came out a few months later. Yet the 
situation in the region was so unstable 
that this report was outdated almost as 
soon as it came out. The breakup of the 
Soviet Union in December 1991 
invalidated many points made in it. 
IRB members were often guided by 
newspaper and magazine clippings 
collected in the documentation centre or 
presented by the claimant's legal 
representative. Since media coverage of 
this region in turmoil is often contra- 
dictory, so are the decisions reached. 
Canada and the United States supported 
independence of the former Baltic 
republics. Thus mass media coverage of 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia was 
generally positive, making it difficult for 
claimants from these states to prove 
persecution. Gradually, as the claimants 
supplied documentary evidence on 
discrimination against ethnic minorities 
in these states, panel members started 
lending an ear to their claims. Similarly 
in the case of Ukraine, many IRB 
members were influenced in their 
decisions by Kravchuk's public 
statements, in which he regretted the 
genocide of Jews during the Holocaust 
and said that Jews were welcome in his 
country. It was up to refugee claimants 
and their legal counsel to supply the 
,decision-makers with documents 
illustrating widespread anti-Semitism at 
the grassroots level in Ukraine. 
In making decisions on Soviet- 
Jewish refugee claims, panel members 
were consistently preoccupied by three 
problems-proof of being Jewish, 
citizenship and migration to Israel. With 
respect to the first one, internal Soviet 
passports list one's nationality, while 
external travel passports lack this 
information. In order to detect fraud- 
ulent claims of anti-Semitic persecution 
by non-Jews, panel members inquired 
about observance of Jewish religion and 
traditions. Yet most Soviet Jews are 
secular andknow very littleabout Jewish 
history and its traditions. Jewish identity 
is maintained more by discrimination 
than by maintenance of a separate 
culture and community. Yet ignorance 
of Jewish high holy days among some 
Soviet-Jewish claimants cast doubt on 
the vaidity of their claims. 
Table 4 
Regional Effect on Refugee Claims from the U.S.S.R. Adjudicated 
January - September 1991 
Decision Atlantic Quebec Ontario Prairies B.C. Total 
Claims heard 77 232 105 16 12 442 
Positive 62 168 28 9 1 268 
Negative 12 29 41 4 9 95 
Ratio pos. Ineg. 5.2 5.8 0.7 2.3 0.1 2.8 
Table 5: Regional Effect on Total Refugee Claims Adjudicated 
January-September 1991 
Outcome Atlantic Quebec Ontario Prairies B.C. National 
Claims heard 317 7,473 11,697 403 1,214 21,104 
Rejected 94 2,184 2,376 115 508 5,277 
Upheld 223 5,289 9,321 288 706 15,827 
Ratio pos. Ineg. 2.4 2.4 3.9 2.5 1.4 3.0 
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Citizenship, the second issue, 
concerns those who were born in a Soviet 
republic different than the one from 
which they escaped. Some panel 
members insisted that if a claimant was 
born in Belorussia and experienced 
persecution in Russia, he or she should 
be able to claim Belorussian citizenship. 
No regard was given in this case to the 
fact that a claimant may not speak the 
language of this newly formed country 
and that the institution of propiska 
(residence permit) is still alive 
throughout the former Soviet Union and 
prevents one from moving freely within 
it. 
Finally, the last stumbling block has 
been the issue of emigration to Israel. 
Several Soviet-Jewish claimants were 
asked why they did not go to the state 
that would give them the most protection 
The Immigration and 
Refugee Board's treatment 
of Soviet rejbgee claimants 
reflects neitherpositive nor 
negative bias. 
from anti-Semitism and that is willing to 
accept and settle as many Jews as 
possible. Apart from tremendous 
hardships experienced by recent alia in 
Israel, what often prevented Soviet Jews 
from choosing this alternative was the 
relatively lengthy procedure of getting 
an exit visa when one applied for 
permanent resettlement. Getting a 
visitois exit visa may take a few months 
as well, but it is faster and is therefore 
preferred by someone who fears for his 
or her life. 
The Immigration and Refugee 
Board's treatment of Soviet refugee 
claimants reflects neither positive nor 
negative bias. In 1991 the acceptance rate 
for the U.S.S.R. was at the national 
average (see Table 3). Among thuty-four 
countries (each of which had at least a 
hundred refugee claims adjudicated in 
1991) ranked by the acceptance ratio, the 
U.S.S.R. is right in the middle. 
There are regional differences in 
outcomes of claims made by Soviet 
citizens (see Table 4). In the first nine 
months of 1991 they were most 
successful in obtaining refugee status in 
the Atlantic provinces and Quebec. 
Ontario and British Columbia had the 
lowest acceptance ratio for claimants 
from this country. It is interesting that 
while differences in the acceptance rate 
of all refugees existed between various 
provinces of Canada, they were less 
signrficant during the same period (see 
Table 5). 
By the end of 1991 the acceptance 
ratio dropped consistently by a few 
decimal points in each province. In 
Ontario it went down most sigruficantly 
to 3.1. It continued falling in the first 
quarter of 1992. The national ratio of 
positive to negative decisions went 
down to 1.6 and in British Columbia to as 
low as 0.4. In Ontario, where the ratio 
was the highest in 1991, it went down to 
1.7. This affected Soviet refugee 
claimants as well. 
On June 16, 1992 Canadian Im- 
migration Minister Bernard Valcourt 
introduced Bill C-86 to Parliament. The 
proposed Bill advocates eliminating one 
of two existing status determination 
hearings in order to speed up the process 
of refugee status determination; 
fingerprinting all refugee claimants to 
prevent criminals from entering the 
country; and granting more power to 
immigration officers at borders, enabling 
them to reject refugee claims. Valcourt 
also proposes the cessation of welfare 
assistance and legal aid to refugee 
claimants. Critics of the proposed bill 
argue that it "eliminates allconstitutional 
guarantees of the rights of refugees."' 
The proposed bill indicates that Canada 
wants to curb significantly the number of 
refugee claimants entering the country. 
In the case of Soviet claimants this has 
already been achieved to a significant 
degree. Within the last year, it was 
extremely difficult to obtain a visitor's 
visa at the Canadian Consulate in 
Moscow. What will Soviet Jews opt for 
under these circumstances? Will they go 
to Israel despite the problems of 
settlement and tension related to the 
Israeli-Palestinianconflict? Will they stay 
in Russia and other parts of the former 
Soviet Union and try to resist anti-Semitic 
attacks? Will they flood Europe? 
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